Attribution Theory: An Academic Evaluation

Attribution is the process by which an individual ascribes explanations, via their perceptions to causes of events and reactions of other people. (Kelley and Michela, 1980). The focus of this essay is around attribution theory, the dominant theoretical perspective, built up of mainly classical ideas around the formation of attributions. (Fiske and Taylor, 1991). It is the purpose of this literature to evaluate such perspectives before drawing a logical and evidence based conclusion.

Attribution theory's began with the work of Heider (1958 cited in Baxter & Blaithwaite, 2008; Hewstone, 1983) and 'Naive Epistemology.' Heider's theories surround the premise that people use attributions in order to make sense of the world, their surroundings and to better control their environments and to create causal explanations. (Baxter and Blaithwaite, 2008; Stainton Rogers, 2011). This involves discriminating between the internal (inside one) and external (ones surroundings) causes. This appears to be a protective action (Stainton Rogers, 2011).

This was somewhat supported by the research conducted by Visconti, Secler and Kochendefer-Ladd (2013) Their research was conducted around the attribution of child victimisation. They found differences in the attributions made (and thus whether the child sought support). This was dependent on the type of bullying which occurred. The attributions seemed to offer a protective measure.

Baxter and Blaithwaite (2008) outlined two additional factors of attribution in accordance with Heider's original theory. These being that an individual will make attributions about a person based on their perception of the event. Also whether the event is stable or unstable (referring to the likelihood it may happen again), and controllable or uncontrollable (to what extent could it be helped.)

The theories suggested by Heider are not without criticisms. Gough, McFadden and McDonald (2013) place emphasis on the rise of more qualitative thinking occurring around the time the theories were proposed. This criticism is not ignored in the evaluation by Hewstone (1983), in which he accuses the work of being of abstract thought and little scientific evidence. Although we see research which has been done following a framework based upon Heider's theory of attribution, these serve only as minor correlations and do not 'prove' anything.

The theory of attribution has, since Heider, developed. Jones and Davis (1965, cited in Baxter and Blaithwaite, 2008) suggested the correspondent theory of attribution. The model assumes that one associates certain behaviour with certain characteristics based upon past attributions. Much of the focus of the work of Jones and Davis revolves around mental assessment of a persons behaviour, whereby the individual assesses another’s behaviour with comparison to the expected behaviour, this is referred to as the non-common effect. (Hewstone, 1983).

The idea that an individual can better make attributions given more information is obvious. Research conducted by Thibaut & Riecken (1955) supports this. Kelley and Michela (1980) refer to this work in their paper around attribution theory, and explain that their work is of importance. The study states that in any situation, with two people; one perceived to be of a higher status and one of a lower status. The individual will attribute their reasons for helping differently, usually according to their status. It is then clear that this research acts as a criticism for attribution error, referred to later. Given information, it seems one is more likely to judge the situations differently and perhaps more objectively. This would be expected according to the point of individual differences outlined below.

Several points of dispute exist around such attributions. Research by Coleman (2011) has suggested that there is often a tendency for people attribute success to themselves and failure to others. Critical thinkers such as Gough, McFadden and McDonald (2013) have suggested individual differences as a direction of blame attribution, for which they also suggest cultural differences.

This allows for a more comparative approach. Looking at differences between Heider and Jones and Davis, we find some interesting points. Although theories produced by Heider are, as mentioned previously devised by a more abstract way of thinking, they are suggested to be more applicable cross-culturally (Baxter & Blaithwaite, 2008). However, Correspondent theory has received more research. The argument exists that we each make attributions differently which involves different considerations (Coleman, 2011; Anderson & Chen, 2002) it would seem that in most cases, the ideas proposed by Jones and Davis are overall quite applicable (Gough, McFadden and McDonald, 2013).

Kelley & Michela (1980) further the information around attribution. Approaching from a perspective similar to that of Jones and Davis. They refer to three important features of the ideas proposed of Jones and Davis (1965, cited in Kelley and Michela, 1980). These being: Information, beliefs and motivation. These are all subject to variance with regard to their effect and prominence according to individual differences and social interaction (Anderson and Chen, 2002). Although this seems like a critical approach to the work of Jones and Davis (1965), it may be more accurate to see the work of Kelley (1967) as an expansion of this work. For it served the function of allowing reasonable additions to be place where they were seemingly necessary. With this the authors outline the ‘General Model of Attributions’ (Kelley and Michela, 1980), in which they outline differences between antecederts, attributions and consequences. These are important features, for they define clear boundaries between attribution theory and its neighbouring, behavioural related theory ‘attributional theory’.

One of the more recent and dominant theories was suggested by Kelley (1967). The Covariation (ANOVA) model, cited in Hewstone (1983), Kelley and Michela (1980) and Stainton Rogers (2011). The model focuses on the importance of multiple forms of information. Kelley (1967) states that attribution’s are made based on covaried observations of the event. Simply put, when an act occurs alongside an event continually. Focuses of Kelley’s ANOVA model are; the distinctiveness of the act, the consistency of the act, and the consensus to the act (Kelley, 1967)

Even though the ANOVA model is still one of the more accepted models around attribution today (Baxter & Blaithwaite, 2008) some criticisms have been made around the area the model. Kelley & Michela (1980) present some more important criticisms in review of the work of Kelley (1967). They concede that despite the model gaining much support, in that many studies which went on to use the model as a framework, found some level of support for the creation of attributions as suggested by the model. However, some studies found that despite the predictions being mostly correct some of the perceptions made were influenced by the persons social surroundings, opinions and the information readily available to them.

These facts then directly correlate with those findings of Anderson & Chen (2002), Thibaut & Riecken (1955) and the suggestions of Gough, McFadden and McDonald (2013). When looking at the criticisms surrounding attribution theory, it all seems to follow a similar trajectory. Particularly concerning individual differences (Baxter & Blaithwaite, 2008; Gough, McFadden and McDonald, 2013) Which leads to an interesting point of attribution biases and error.

Biases in attributions are those attributions which are often self-serving rather than supporting one’s informative perceptions of the world. In this they often act as a form of distorted reality. Hewstone (1983) suggests that biases occur due to issues such as ‘selective attention’, by which one’s attentions are moved from something which is important to the attribution, onto another seemingly more important stimulus which may or may not be relevant to the forming attribution. Creating the assumption that the attribution is still correct, and allowing it to act as any other attribution despite it being a cognitive error.

Hewstone (1983) outlines another point as to why these biases occur. Focus for this is directed toward the individual and their tendency to believe things to be true, despite them lacking in evidence. This once again links to the work of Anderson & Chen (2002) and the formation and changing of opinions based on the beliefs of significant others. By which one is likely to form attributions which might be false. Also to the work of Thibaut & Riecken (1955) on status and attribution and the probability that people will attribute those who are ‘vulnerable’ as being externally motivated, when it is unlikely that this is the rule of every case.

Chaikin & Baldwin (1981, cited in Hewstone, 1983) conducted research which found that people have ‘frozen beliefs’. This refers simply to those beliefs one holds strong to. These beliefs they say, are less prone to change than are those in which the person less believes. This shows that there is some variance between the persons attributions, for some seem held more securely than others and are as such less prone to change and manipulation.

The concept of attribution error focuses primarily on the use of situational and dispositional attributions and follows the belief that the individual is more likely to make situational attributions of negative events to themselves, and of positive events to others (Coleman, 2013). This relates directly to the research of Coleman (2011), that people will attribute success to themselves and failure to others. Research results promote the idea that attribution errors are a way in which the individual can save their self esteem and protect their element of self superiority (Tajfel & Turner, 1979 cited in Coleman, 2013). Li, Johnson, Cohen, Williams, Knowles and Chen (2012) highlight the excessive use of internal attributions and insufficient use of external attributions relating to others. This shows a subjective and protective use of attributions in that the individual ascribes potentially incorrect attributions to a situation (Coleman, 2013; Li et al, 2012).

Criticisms around attribution theory as a whole have been drawn from many areas. Kelley and Michela (1980) directly mentioned the sometimes lacking evidence around the ANOVA model. Gough, McFadden and McDonald (2013) outline strong points when they mentioned that much of the research is of a qualitative nature. This is supportive of the notion that attribution theory is tested mainly by word of mouth, and direct reports of the participants thoughts (Kelley & Michela, 1980). Heider’s own work was criticised for being ‘of abstract thought’, and so as the founding theory for attribution, it would make the theory’s foundations vulnerable to criticisms.

However, Gough, McFadden and McDonald (2013) openly stated the fact that, despite attribution theory often being criticised for its seemingly psychology, and it’s lacking of empirical evidence, it is not simply a criticism of attribution theory as other - more quantitative theories – have acquired little supporting evidence throughout their development and still remain prominent theories. A key point to stress also when looking at criticisms is to refer back to the beginning, and to Heider’s ‘naïve epistemology’, or ‘common sense psychology’. Which simply means, we gain attributions through the use of common sense.

To conclude the above, it is important to mention that of the multiple theories which have been suggested above, each carry their own importance and significant contributions to the way in which psychologists see and research causal attribution. A large consideration is around the matter of individual differences with emphasis on the fact that we all make these attributions differently. It may benefit to combine individual differences with attibution bias to enable theorists to demonstrate that attributions differs between events and people. Many things can impact an attribution and alter it, the most prominent being social interaction (Anderson and Chen, 2002; Kelley and Michela, 1980) and personal opinions (Thibaut & Riecken, 1955; Visconti, Secler & Kochendefer-Ladd, 2013). As to the matter surrounding the use of qualitative methods and the abstract thinking behind the theory seemed to warrant a lack of consideration. On many levels qualitative methods have proven important in reviewing the inner thoughts of a person, and so offer advantages when exploring how people make causal attributions. Consequently when much research seems to support the notion of attribution theory, it would be a matter of great regret if one should discard it simply for the more abstract theories of common sense psychologies.

References:

• Anderson, S. M., & Chen, S. (2002). The Relational Self: An Interpersonal\social Cognitive Theory. Psychological Review, 109 (40, 619-645)
• Baxter, L. A., & Braitwaite, D. O. (2008). Emerging Theories in Interpersonal Communication. >London: Saga
• Coleman, M. D. (2011). Emotion and the Self Serving Bias.Current Psychology, 30, 345-354
• Coleman, M. D. (2013) Emotion and the Ultimate Attribution Error. Current Psychology, 32, 71 – 81. DOI: 10.1007/s122144-013-9164-7
• Fiske. S. T., & Taylor. S. E. (1991).Social Cognition. London: McGraw-Hill
• Gough, B., McFadden, M., & McDonald, M. (2013)Critical Social Psychology. Hampshire: Palgrace Macmillan
• Hewstone, M. (1983). Attribution Theory. Social and Functional Extensions. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
• Kelley, H. H. (1967) Attribution Theory in Social Psychology. Nebraska Symposium on Motivation. 15, 192-238
• Kelley, H. H., & Michela, J. L. (1980). Attribution Theory and Research. Annual Review of Psychology, 31, 457-501
• Li, Y. J., Johnson, K. A., Cohen, A. B., Williams, M. J., Knowles, E. D., & Chen, Z. (2012) Fundamental(ist) Attribution Error: Protestants are Dispositionally Focused. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 102(2), 281-290
• Stainton Roger, W. (2011). Social Psychology.
• Thibaut, J. W., & Riecken, H. W. (1955) Some Determinants and Consequences of the Perception of Social Causality.Journal of Personality, 24, 113-133. DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-6494.1955.tb01178.x
• Visconti, K. J., Secler, C. M., & Kochendefer-Ladd, B. (2013). Coping With Peer Victimization: The Role of Children’s Attributions. School of Psychology Quarterly, 28(2), 122-140.